History never repeats itself.
Causes and results at one moment are never identical to those of another. This does not imply, however, that history does not present patterns of similarity with modern events. Evaluations of the current conflict in Iraq have led many pundits and casual observers alike to parallel the war with the conflict in Vietnam a generation ago. However, few have realized, that a conflict between another Western power and an underdeveloped Islamic territory may show a closer resemblance.
In his Jan. 12 interview with Scott Pelley of CBS News’s 60 Minutes, President George W. Bush mentioned that his newest reading materials included various histories of D.C. architecture and, more importantly, a thirty-year-old work by a famed British historian. That work, A Savage War of Peace by Sir Alistair Horne, delves deeply into a sometimes-forgotten conflict: the Algerian War for Independence against the French from 1954 to 1962.
While the underlying reasoning
for the conflict, Algerian nationals attempting to gain freedom from
a French colonial power at its sunset, lacks comparability to Operation:
Iraqi Freedom, certain aspects of how the struggle took place and its
effects on French and Algerian society are more congruent.
Horne, who focuses most of his writing and research on French history, has described these predominant similarities as three-fold. First, the Algerian insurgency, though small in the first few months of the conflict, found attacks against French military forces risky and unproductive. Insurgents instead used guerilla tactics of terror against more vulnerable entities like the Arab police forces and security squadrons in a similar manner to the current Iraqi insurgency. Such a tactic was utilized to demoralize support for French and Coalition forces, respectively.
Another grim similarity is what Horne has described as the problem of “porous frontiers.” In a January 10, 2007 interview with Christopher Lydon of OpenSource Radio, Horne described the frustrations of French forces in dealing with the Algerian insurgency. These groups would escape the French by darting into Tunisia to the east and Morocco to the west in order to “regroup” and launch fresh attacks upon their return. The same is occurring in Iraq, where insurgent forces have utilized Syria to the northwest and Iran to the east as bases of recovery. These unsecured borders have also allowed foreign fighters from these aforementioned nations to join into Iraqi battles, while the Algerian conflict was far more national in character.
The final stark comparison made by Horne involves torture. A Savage War posits that the French utilization of torture may have won individual battles such as the Battle of Algiers, but eventually lost the war itself by eroding both French public sentiment and sympathetic Algerians’ support. Horne warned Lydon that, while negative events involving torture or allegations of torture took nearly 18 months to fully saturate into the French public, today’s age of rapid, internet-based communications and the 24-hour media cycle can spread news of incidents such as the Abu Gharib Prison scandal of 2004 in seconds.
Horne cites torture by military
forces as far more damaging to a war effort than torture by police forces
because the former “involves the honor of the nation” according
to Thomas E. Ricks of The New York Times.
Like the Iraqi conflict today,
Horne describes the Algerian episode as one that “the vast majority
of Frenchmen lived unaffected by . . .” This detachment may have aided
the gradual yet profound drop in public support for the conflict.
In similar fashion to Bush declaring the end of major combat operations in the infamous “Mission Accomplished” speech of May, 2003, Horne outlines the unfounded optimism among French military planners and political leaders. Some even stated that the Algerian conflict was “virtually over” years before the French withdrawal.
Two major differences between
the conflicts must be acknowledged. The first is that during and after
the Algerian conflict, over one million French non-Arabs needed to be
removed from Algeria. This made decision-making by President Charles
de Gaulle during the Fifth Republic and the last half-dozen or so prime
ministers of the Fourth Republic more difficult insofar as they had
to take into account the French citizenry whose families had called
Algeria home for several generations. Along with the loss of territory,
de Gaulle’s eventual retreat in 1962 took a direct toll on these citizens
and their property and livelihood. Sympathetic Algerians also fled during
and after the conflict into France, sparking assimilation dilemmas which
still haunt France to this day. The second is that both the Iraqi and
Algerian conflicts lacked a large number of prisoners of war, differentiating
the pair from the often-paralleled Vietnam conflict.
Horne describes the Algerian conflict as different from conventional ones in that it centered on a “tug-of-war for the soul of Algeria.” A comparison between this conflict and Vietnam as well as Iraq can be drawn accurately in this respect.
Yet, despite Horne’s anti-imperialist bent and public reservations about British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Bush, he has issued grave warnings about Democrat-sponsored plans to withdraw or redeploy troops without stabilizing Iraq. Horne draws the distinction that the Algerian conflict was a nationalist struggle for independence while the Iraqi struggle is more fundamentalist and religious in nature.
He also draws a distinction between the current region in conflict and past episodes: “You [the United States] cut and ran in Vietnam and you got away with it . . . [but] the domino theory absolutely applies [in the Middle East].” Horne continued by stating a concern shared by many who oppose immediate or even a phased withdrawal with Lydon: “What is going to happen in Saudi Arabia? What is going to happen in Iran if you [the United States] simply cut and run?”
“Stable” and “non-hostile” governments in places like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan are teetering on the brink while already fundamentalist governments like Iran and Syria could be left emboldened by a Coalition withdrawal. Domestic Iraqi allies along with the Kurdish minority in Northern Iraq would likely pay the ultimate price if some American politicians had their way and troops withdrew.
In reading Horne’s work and
other testaments of the conflict in Algeria some half-century ago, Bush
and his advisors should carefully assess the importance of not underestimating
the determination of insurgent forces and the dire consequences of leaving
a boiling cauldron in an already unsettled region. It took de Gaulle
four years after taking power to finally withdraw from Algeria, and
he “left without his pants,” according to Horne. Such an outcome
cannot happen in Iraq. America and the West cannot “get away” with
another Vietnam and face few direct consequences.
Horne’s solution centers
around an attempt to “remove the priests” by staging an “economic
miracle” in Iraq or elsewhere in the Middle East. Only then, he believes,
will the civil strife die down and radical clerics be ignored by the
everyday citizen of Iraq. This scheme, however, seems optimistic at
best in the current climate. Answers in the Algerian conflict did not
come easily, and the same can be said about the Iraqi struggle.
One thing is certain: Horne’s wisdom, analysis, and warnings should neither be ignored nor belittled by this administration.
In today’s world, history will not repeat itself. Simply leaving everything behind, including one’s pants, is not a viable option. We should be so lucky.
Comments